Wednesday, November 4, 2009
Much Ado About A Mite
Berkeley argues for his idealism from the relativity of perception. He compares the size of a mite's foot as seen by the mite itself, by a human and by some smaller microorganism. What, exactly, is the argument? Is the argument successful? If not, how do we resist the sucking of all so-called primary qualities into the mind?
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Berkeley is correct in proposing that all characteristics of an object are contained within the mind. In this case Berkeley is examining extension as a nonessential characteristic. Berkeley uses the mite’s foot analogy to show that the foot is perceived by to observers to be a different size at the same time. He posits that if the idea of size was coming from the mite’s foot than there would be a uniform perception of it regardless of the observer. Berkeley uses this show that the idea of the mite’s foots extension must come from within the mind of the observer to avoid the absurdity of a single object having multiple sizes simultaneously. He then puts the challenge to the reader to explain which is the correct perception. Both are equally valid.
ReplyDeleteAlthough the mite’s foot analogy serves to demonstrate the problem I want to add my own metaphor to clarify the problem of extension. I prefer to imagine the tree outside of our philosophy room. As Omar has repeatedly suggested we will use a measuring system that is dependent on cesium and light speed so that we have a absolutely defined length. For the purposes of visualization imagine that this absolute length is equivalent to a meter stick. Imagine viewing the meter stick while it is right in front of you nose. You will perceive the meter stick to be very large and there will be no way for you to measure it’s size other than through what you can immediately perceive. If you put the meter stick out in the tree it would appear much smaller. There is no way for your mind to distinguish between these two objects. They are the same meter stick but are different sizes. It is an absurdity for you to observe the same meter stick to be two sizes. The idea of size cannot be therefore not be contained within the meter stick. It must be in the mind of the observer.
At this point one may say that it is possible for two observers to be in different spots and at a single point in time measure the same size of the meter stick. You could argue (Omar has argued) that because these two observers could agree on a measurement and report that measurement to each other they can agree on an absolute size. By agreeing on an absolute size they would be showing that an absolute size exists.
There are many ways to respond to this argument. I will only present one (it is getting a little late). It is impossible to set up a way for these two observers to be sure that they are measuring the same thing. There is no way to determine that they have the same angle of observation, distance from the “object”, and other characteristics that you would set for what you would consider a “proper observation.”
I also want to point out what time it is. And remind Omar to talk about his light clock.
ReplyDeleteFor your discussion about the subjectivity in measuring a meter stick, I beg to differ. Nate's argument is that there is no way for us to tell independently whether a meter stick is close or far from you, and that therefore depending on its distance from you it will appear to be different sizes. I have a few objections. First, this is only true if you think that perception has no connection with processing information in the mind. I would argue that when we perceive things, there are two steps: taking in the incoming data from the outside world, and then interpreting it. That interpretation allows for more objective understanding because it applies prior knowledge about the physical world to take into account the circumstances under which we perceive things. For example, I know that light bends when it shines back from one of those crazy warped mirrors at carnivals and stuff, but I know that I don't actually look like that, because I understand what happens when light bounces off of uneven surfaces. I apply this to my idea of the light clock w/ LED readout on a cart idea. If there is an absolute standard of measurement based off of the distance light travels in a second (length) and the time it takes to get a number of orbits around a cesium atom (time), then regardless of from where I look at the light clock's LED readout, it will still yield the same length for a meter. The reason that Berkeley assumes that extension is completely subjective is that he is basing all of his observations from SUBJECTIVE standpoints. But once you establish an absolute measure, and a consistent way to measure that (my example with the cart ensures a more or less OBJECTIVE perspective since you can't misinterpret an LED readout unless you're just dumb/ignorant), then we are now taking into account our subjective perceptions, and processing that information into something useful and definite--hence, the preservation of extension as an intrinsic property of materials.
ReplyDeleteSecond, if you are only able to use sight as the only sense available, that may be true, BUT we are never able to isolate vision. I can tell how far the meterstick is by yelling and seeing how long it would take to echo back at me (granted, that can be pretty tough to do hahah). If it is still within reach, I can see how far I'd have to extend my arm to it before I can feel the meterstick in my hands. The point is, there are ways to tell distance so long as you don't isolate vision.
I agree with Omar. If we were dependent simply upon vision to qualify our perspectives then little would make sense in this world. I have my own views on the topic which i will now underline. Nate states that we cannot find a common measurement between any two observers and thus avoid the absurdity that is one object with two different sizes. I find this to be a faulty statement because (as all of us are) the two observers are built from the bottom up from the same material. Each of them is composed of X number of atoms that are the EXACT same size. To the two observers (ironically) observing this is impossible. They have not the breadth of sight to encompass the fact that they are made of the same building blocks. But let us pose a hypothetical for a moment in which both observers CAN see that they are made up of X number of equally sized building blocks. Now the mite can see that the human is made up of so and so many building blocks, and the human the mite. Now both of them can see the ruler (borrowed from nates argument) as an arrangement of X building blocks, where X is the same number for BOTH observers. Ta-Da. We have a scale. In essence, i find this to be an argument of material foundationalism, finding a unit of scale that is undeniably true.
ReplyDeleteIn my opinion, this is one of Berkeley's finest arguments. This "meter" that keeps being brought up may have this distance, that if walked, will remain the same no matter what kind of organism walks it, but i believe Berkeley is arguing something a tad different. It is the dimensions as we perceive them that change. That meter is endless to mite, but it is hardly noticeable to us. Same meter, but it is seen differently. How could something that remains constant be seen differently? That's absurd. There is no way that a mite can see its foot as we do. Same foot, but the size as it is perceived changes. When a mite looks at its foot, it can probably see it in detail, where as we probably can't see it without a microscope. Which is another absurdity. How can an organisms size change when we look at it with our naked eye, and then in a microscope. It is obviously bigger when we look at it underneath the microscope. But is it not absurd to think that this organism is actually two different sizes. Now i don't wholeheartedly believe in all of this, But it is a very well thought out argument. It really makes you think twice about whether the size exists intrinsically or whether or not it exists in our minds.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley raises a semi valid argument. I agree that when mite's foot is perceived by a mite and by a human, they will appear different sizes. Where Berkeley goes wrong is when he crosses from perception, to reality. Berkeley attempts to use this to prove that dimension is in the mind, but he fails to understand that dimension and perceived size are not the same thing. Dimension is different from perceived size due to the fact that there is, and must be, some absolute size by which all things must be measured. Though we have culturally defined things such as a meter, a foot, or an inch, what we haven't defined are the very building blocks of matter, atoms. As stated before, regardless of the observer, there will be X number of atoms in a given length, no ifs, ands, or buts about it. Now one might suggest that an atom would "appear" (in quotation marks since a mite can't actually see atoms, nor can we) larger to a mite than to a human, but that doesn't change the amount of atoms in a set distance. If you tell a mite to walk 10000000 atoms, and you tell a person to walk the same number of atoms, they will end at the same place. The mite may think that the distance it walked was very long, while a human might think it was short. HOWEVER, this does not change the fact that they walked the EXACT same amount of distance. The PERCEIVED size is different, but the DIMENSION is constant and absolute.
ReplyDeleteEven though one could potentially argue that because you can't possibly be in two places at once, it's impossible to tell whether the size of an object changes based on one's position. But I think to trust people is a valid way of confirming that objects do not actually alter in size even though it may seem so, for example, when you travel farther or closer to an object. Even though Berkely argues that our senses decieve us and cannot be trusted, because all humans are of the same anatomy, wouldn't it be reasonable to conclude that they sense the same things you would if you were in their position? If they were to relay you information about something that you are not currently experiencing, undoubtedly you would accept that to be true. And if they were to describe to you what they were sensing at the same time from the same position you would certainly agree with what they were saying. Even further, in everyday life we also accept a common absolute measurement of things, and it's absurd to declare size and other primary qualities to be in the mind if immediatley afterward you go and solve a geometry problem. Therefore, all primary qualities such as size and shape, as Berkeley described could noever be soley in the mind.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley isn't claiming that our senses deceive us. Rather, he argues that our senses should be the foundation on which we rely, which effectively rules out an absolute system of measurement because such a system isn't intuitive. What's a meter to an infant? Specific measurement through units can't be innately understood, but perception can. Accordingly, when it comes to the variable size of the mite's foot per the three described perspectives, the only adequate argument is that primary qualities exist solely in the mind, because that way the foot is only changing in relation to perception (as opposed to changing in relation to the actual, physical world, which would be an absurdity.
ReplyDeletemy only objection to the idea is say for example, you walk into a completely black room. you have no previous knowledge that there is anything in the room. Walking around you bump into something, surprised by this realization you back away and hit another thing that seems to be a table. keeping in mind that you are without sight or previous knowledge how can one say that the outside world is all based on perception. As the mite believes his foot normal sized but humans perceive his foot as microscopic. If what we perceive is based on previous knowledge, then explain to me the situation in the dark room?
ReplyDeletethis idea might be slightly off from the mite argument but it's a rant i must bring forth...
I agree with Falafel on the point that everything we perceive is not always based on previous knowledge. Yes, the mite would view its foot to be rather large, but a human would view it to be tiny, both basing their conclusions on comparison. This method of perception through comparison would imply that the mite and the human both needed previous knowledge (each had an idea of how big familiar things, like themselves, are compared to the foot)in order to determine how big the foot is. However, this is not always necessary (see Falafel's dark room analogy), and therefore Berkeley's argument encounters a flaw.
ReplyDelete